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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. L. MURPHY TRUCKING 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CLIMATE CONTROL, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent, 
vs. 
AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., 
Co-Defendant — Co-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by an interstate motor carrier to 
recover freight charges from the consignee on four ship-
ments of goods delivered to and accepted by the consignee. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On cross motions for Summary Judgment, Judge 
Stewart M. Hanson granted Respondent's and Co-Re-
Case No. 
13555 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
spondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds 
that the Appellant was estopped from recovering the 
unpaid freight charges and denied Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Amended 
Order granting Summary Judgment to the Respondent 
and Co-Respondent and a reversal of the Order denying 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the 
alternative, vacating the Order for Summary Judgment 
and remanding the case for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 20, 1972, a complaint (R-195) was 
filed by the Appellant to recover from the Respondent 
$7,283.20 for freight charges resulting from the trans-
portation of four truckloads of air conditioning units from 
Carteret, New Jersey, to Salt Lake City, together with 
interest on that amount at the rate of eight percent (8%) 
per year from November 16, 1971. 
2. The air conditioning units delivered by the Ap-
pellant, E. L. Murphy Trucking Company, were units 
ordered by the Respondent, Climate Control, Inc., from 
the Co-Respondent, American Standard, Inc., pursuant to 
a purchase order contract (R-185) entered into between 
the parties which specifically prescribed that freight 
charges were to be prepaid by American Standard, Inc. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3. Climate Control, Inc. paid American Standard, 
Inc. the sum of $100,000.00 (R-124) on December 30, 
1971, and a balance of $65,280.78 on January 14, 1972, 
pursuant to their contract and that such sum constituted 
payment in full for both the air conditioning units and 
freight charges incurred in transporting them from New 
Jersey to Salt Lake City. 
4. Upon receiving a purchase order from Climate 
Control, Inc. for the air conditioning units, American 
Standard, Inc. contracted with a New Jersey company, 
B & M Trading Company, to pick up the air conditioning 
units at the American Standard plant in Carteret, New 
Jersey, for shipment to Climate Control in Salt Lake City 
(R-41). 
5. On November 9, 1971, American Standard, Inc. 
sent B & M Trading Company a check (No. 9765) in the 
amount of $16,771.17 (R-40) to cover the freight charges 
for the air conditioning units and also to cover freight 
charges for at least one other unrelated shipment. 
6. B & M Trading Company contracted with another 
New Jersey company, East Coast Drayage Company (con-
signor), to deliver the air conditioning units to Salt Lake 
City. 
7. East Coast Drayage Company contracted with E. 
L. Murphy Trucking Company to transport the air con-
ditioning units for shipment on November 5, 1971 under 
Bills of Lading (R-163-166) which named Climate Con-
trol as consignee and East Coast Drayage as consignor. 
3 
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8. Two of the four Bills of Lading were unmarked 
(R~ 164-165), that is, they did not indicate on their face 
whether they were "Prepaid" or "To Be Prepaid". The 
other two Bills of Lading were marked as being either 
"Prepaid" or "To Be Prepaid". (R 166 and 163). Each 
Bill of Lading covered a separate shipment delivered by 
four trucks at different times during a two-day period. 
9. The air conditioning units were delivered and 
accepted by Climate Control on or about November 15-
16, 1971 (R-79. 
10. E. L. Murphy Trucking Company first billed 
East Coast Drayage Company on November 17 and 18, 
1971 (R-79) within the seven (7) day period prescribed 
by the I.C.C. Regulations. 
11. E. L. Murphy Trucking Company virtually had 
daily communications with East Coast Drayage Company 
from the date of billing, including personal visits by E. 
L. Murphy's representatives, and although receiving 
promises that payment would be made, were unable to 
collect the charges that were due. 
12. Continuous attempts were made from February 
to April 7, 1972 to collect from East Coast Drayage Com-
pany (R-83, 84), after which time E. L. Murphy was ad-
vised by their New Jersey counsel that East Coast Drayage 
Company was in financial difficulties and was probably 
judgment-proof. On May 5, 1972 (R-94), American Stand-
ard was notified that Murphy was not able to collect from 
East Coast Drayage. 
4 
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13. Subsequently the matter of collection was turned 
over to an attorney in Salt Lake City and an action was 
filed on December 20, 1972 naming Climate Control, 
Inc. as defendant. Immediately thereafter, Climate Con-
trol, Inc. joined American Standard, Inc. as third party de-
fendant and still subsequently, by motion, the plaintiff 
joined American Standard, Inc. as co-defendant. 
14. In preparation for the Motions for Summary 
Judgment, Murphy obtained an Affidavit (R-19) from 
Mr. John Dillon, Vice President of Climate Control, Inc., 
on October 19, 1973, stating that the payment of 
$165,280.78 to American Standard for the air conditioning 
units delivered by E. L. Murphy Trucking Company was 
based on the following: 
(a) the invoices submitted to Climate Control, Inc. 
by American Standard, 
(b) the assurance of Evan Beauldegard that the goods 
specified in the invoices were received, and 
(c) that the invoices of E. L. Murphy Trucking 
Company were not considered by Climate Con-
trol and were not relied upon by Climate Con-
trol when payment of the above monies were 
made to American Standard, Inc. 
15. The motions for cross summary judgment were 
heard on October 29, 1973 with an amended order (R-l) 
subsequently entered by the Court granting the motions 
of Climate Control and American Standard and denying 
the motion of E. L. Murphy for Summary Judgment. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING CLIMATE CONTROLS AND AMERI-
CAN STANDARD'S MOTIONS FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT, AS THE RECORD FAILS 
TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT BASED ON 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
It is well settled that before the Doctrine of Equitable 
Estoppel can be applied to prevent a party from enforcing 
a right, it is essential that it be affirmatively shown that 
a representation has been made which induced the other 
party to rely upon that representation to his detriment. 
Equitable estoppel is applied only as a defense. It thus 
operates as a shield and not as a sword. The party invok-
ing estoppel must show that they relied on and acted upon 
the declarations or conduct of the party sought to be 
estopped and was misled thereby. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel 
and Waiver Sect. 1 et seq.; Northern State Construction 
Co. v. Robbins et al, 76 Wash. 2d 357, 457 P.2d 187, 
(1969). 
In the matter currently under review, the Respondent 
Climate Control, Inc., set forth, in its amended answer, the 
affirmative defense of estoppel, alleging that E. L. Murphy 
was estopped from asserting its claim for carrier charges 
on each shipment as set forth in its Complaint on the 
grounds that Climate Control, Inc., relying on the Bills 
of Lading evidencing "Freight Prepaid", fully paid for 
all freight charges attendant to the transactions. 
6 
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in other words, if Climate Control's defense of estop-
pel is to prevail, it is essential that Climate Control estab-
lish from the record that each shipment covered by a sep-
arate Bill of Lading was, in fact, marked "Prepaid" and 
that they did, in fact, rely upon each Bill of Lading when 
paying the freight charges and, but for the representa-
tions, would have not paid the freight charges which 
were then due. 
In reviewing the Bills of Lading, the Courts atten-
tion is respectfully directed to the fact that only Bill of 
Lading 2930 was marked "To Be Prepaid" and that only 
Bill of Lading 2931 was marked "Prepaid". The other 
two shipments, covered by Bills of Lading 2926 and 2918 
were unmarked and did not indicate on their face whether 
the Bills of Lading were or were not prepaid. The only 
document submitted to Climate Control upon delivery 
of each shipment was the corresponding Bill of Lading. 
Where the party invoking estoppel was not induced to act 
to his detriment or did not rely on the representations 
made by the party sought to be estopped, the defense of 
estoppel cannot be sustained. Farmers & Merchants Bank 
v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 4 Utah 2d 155, 
289 P.2d 1045 (1955); Green v. Gam, 11 Utah 2d 375, 
359 P.2d 1050, (1961). 
All other papers relating to the transaction, such as 
shipping orders and invoices, were either retained by 
Murphy or submitted to East Coast Drayage. The fact 
that two of the Bills of Lading were unmarked (R 164-
165) and did not indicate on their face whether the ship-
ment was or was not prepaid, placed Climate Control on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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notice that two of the shipments may not have been pre-
paid. It also placed Climate Control on notice that they 
ought to make inquiry as to whether the other two ship-
ments may have been mistakenly marked "Prepaid". 
If Climate Control and American Standard are to 
prevail in their defense of estoppel, it is essential that the 
record support the allegation that the Bills of Lading were 
marked "Prepaid" and that they relied on such declara-
tions to their detriment. The record, and particularly the 
Affidavit executed by John Dillon, Vice President of Cli-
mate Control, Inc., supports E. L. Murphy's position that 
Climate Control did not in any way rely upon Murphy's 
Bills of Lading in making payment but rather paid the 
freight charges pursuant to their obligation arising from 
the contract entered into with American Standard. As 
the Affidavit states, the money paid to American Stand-
ard for the goods delivered by Murphy was based on, 
(1) invoices of American Standard, and (2) assurance of 
one Evan Beauldegard (employee of Climate Control, 
Inc.) that the goods delivered by E. L. Murphy were, in 
fact, received. 
In addition, Mr. Dillon states in his Affidavit that 
the Bills of Lading of E. L. Murphy Trucking Company 
were not relied upon by Climate Control in making pay-
ment to American Standard. This means that Murphy's 
Bills of Lading could not have misled, or induced, or in-
fluenced, or, for that matter, played any part at all in 
Climate Control making payment to American Standard. 
E. L. Murphy submits that the record clearly supports 
Murphy's position that neither Climate Control nor 
8 
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American Standard relied on Murphy's Bills of Lading as 
alleged by Climate Control in its answer. In the absence 
of reliance, the defense of estoppel cannot be sustained. 
To fii rther siippoi: t E, L. Murphy's position that the 
lower court erred in granting Climate Control's and 
American Standard's Motions for Summary Judgment, 
the Court's attention is directed to Northern State Con-
struction Co. v. Robbins et al, supra. This case sets forth 
the proposition that estoppel cannot be based upon repre-
sentations which tend to induce a party to do an act which 
he is legally bound to do. 
When the above proposition is applied to the case 
under review, it is E. L. Murphy's position that since Cli-
mate Control was obligated under its contract with Ameri-
can Standard to pay American Standard for the carrier 
charges, Climate Control cannot now claim that its pay-
ment was based on any representation made by E, L. Mur-
phy Trucking Co. Climate Control's legal obligation to 
American Standard could not in any way be affected by 
what E. L. Murphy may have done or by what E. L. Mur-
phy may not have done. Climate Control is alleging, in 
essence, that E. L. Murphy Trucking Co. should be estop-
ped because Climate Control was induced to do what it 
was legally bound to do under its contract with American 
Standard. This is contrary to the basic principles of equity 
and justice, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ACCEPT-
ING THE CASES CITED BY CLIMATE CON-
TROL & AMERICAN STANDARD AS BASIS 
FOR GRANTING THEIR MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Climate Control and American Standard relied on 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. National Milling Co., 
409 F. 2d 882 (3rd Cir., 1969) and Consolidated Freight-
ways Corporation v. Admiral Corporation, 442 F. 2d 56 
(7th Cir. 1971) as support for their Motions for Summary 
Judgment. E. L. Murphy respectfully points out that estop-
pel cannot be subjected to fixed and settled rules having 
universal application and cannot be hampered by the 
narrow confines of a technical formula. Dalton Hwy. Dist. 
v. Souder, 88 Idaho 550, 401 P. 2d 813 (1965). Each case 
of estoppel must stand on its own bottom. Houston County 
Board of Review v. Poyner, 236 Ala. 384, 182 So. 455. 
(1938). 
In the Missouri Pacific case, the facts were substan-
tially different from the matter currently under appeal. For 
example, all of the Bills of Lading were marked "Prepaid" 
and, in addition thereto, the record included an uncon-
tradicted Affidavit by the president of the company, clearly 
reciting facts which established an estoppel against the 
railroad. In the instant case, all of the Bills of Lading 
were not marked "Prepaid" and, further, the Affidavit 
from the Vice President of Climate Control clearly estab-
lishes that Climate Control did not rely upon Murphy's 
Bills of Lading in making payment. 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Missouri Pacific case certainly does not stand 
for the proposition that a carrier is summarily estopped 
from collecting unpaid carrier charges from a consignee 
on four shipments when only one of the four Bills of Lad-
ing is marked "Prepaid". Nor does the Missouri Pacific 
case stand for the proposition that equitable estoppel can 
be established and upheld in the absence of a clear show-
ing that the party asserting estoppel did, in fact, rely upon 
representations made by the party sought to be estopped. 
In the Admiral case, as in the Missouri case, all of 
the Bills of Lading were marked "Prepaid" and the car-
rier's contention of nonreliance was factually unsupport-
ed. In addition, the Court put considerable weight on the 
carrier's acts of extending credit beyond the seven (7) day 
limit imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
According to the section of the Interstate Commerce Act 
relating to credit, 9 C.F.R. 1322.1, the carrier may extend 
credit to the shipper for a period of seven days. In the 
case now before the Court, the Appellant billed the ship-
per within two days after delivery and continually there-
after made attempts on :t daily basis to collect the charges 
due. The fact that Appellant was diligent in attempting 
to seek payment of the carrier charges is not denied or 
contradicted by either Climate Control or American Stand-
ard. Murphy submits that it was not the intent of Congress 
to penalize and prevent a carrier from obtaining payment 
of all or part of the money due from a consignee if pay-
ment from a consignor cannot be collected within a Pe-
riod of seven days. If this interpretation is given n, ::n> 
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, it would nn-.m 
that a carrier would never collect unpaid frc-i^hi ; har.ue^ 
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from a consignee because, in essentially every instance, it 
would take at least seven days for the carrier to determine 
whether the consignor was able or would pay the carrier 
charges. E. L. Murphy submits that the purpose of the 
provision was to prevent preferred and prejudicial treat-
ment by a carrier of one consignor over another. The 
seven day limitation was imposed to prevent discrimina-
tion and was not imposed for the benefit of the consignee. 
Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Del. v. Eddy, 
513 P 2d 1161, Or (1973) 
The Court further stated in the Admiral case that 
since all of the Bills of Lading were marked "Prepaid", 
Admiral was under no obligation to check with the carrier 
to see if payment was in fact received by the carrier. In 
the instant case, however, all of the Bills of Lading were 
not marked "Prepaid". This, Murphy submits, placed an 
obligation upon Climate Control to inquire and determine 
if E. L. Murphy was, in fact, paid. Failing to do so, 
any payments made by Climate Control should be con-
strued as being made at Climate Control's own risk. Had 
Climate Control made an inquiry to E. L. Murphy, E. L. 
Murphy would have advised them that they did not re-
ceive payment. A "lack" of diligence by a party claim-
ing estoppel is generally fatal, 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel 
& Waiver, Section 80, p. 721. The Court also determined 
from the facts submitted that the consignee did in fact 
rely on the carrier's Bills of Lading. In the instant case, 
Climate Control admitted that they did not rely on Mur-
phy's Bills of Lading in making payment but rather relied 
12 
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solely on the representations of American Standard that 
the carrier charges were in fact prepaid by American 
Standard (R 46-57). 
It is respectfully submitted that the holdings of the 
Missouri Pacific case and the Admiral case are not appli-
cable to the case on appeal as Climate Control and Ameri-
can Standard have failed to establish, (1) that all four 
Bills of Lading were marked "Prepaid", (2) that repre-
sentations of prepayment were made by the carrier and 
that they relied on such representations, and (3) that 
they acted prudently and diligently prior to making pay-
ment. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING E. L. 
MURPHY'S M O T I O N FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
As set forth in Section 223 of the Motor Carrier Act, 
49 U.S.C. 323 and the cases decided under this section, the 
consignee is generally liable for all freight charges not 
paid by the consignor. This liability is further set forth 
in Section 7 of the Uniform Straight Bills of Lading under 
which the shipments to Climate Control were transported. 
Section 7 of the Uniform Straight Bills of Lading 
and Section 223 of the Motor Carrier Act are essentially 
identical and state in pertinent part, "The owner or con-
signee shall pay the freight and average, if any, and all 
other lawful charges accruing on said property . . . Only 
if he (consignee) is an agent with no beneficial interest in 
13 
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the property which was shipped and has notified the car-
rier of that fact may a consignee avoid his liability for 
payment of the freight charges/' (emphasis added) Pitts-
burgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad v. Fink, 
250 U.S. 577,40 S. Ct. 27, 63 L.Ed. 1151 (1919); Louisville 
& N.R.R. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 70, 
44 S. Ct. 441, 444, 68 L. Ed. 900 (1924); Boston & Me. 
R.R. v. Hannaford Bros., 144 Me. 306, 68 A.2d 1 (1949); 
Central Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R.I.&P. Ry., 20 F.2d 
888 (8 Cir. 1927); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Rae, 
118 N.Y.S. 2d 895, 203 Misc. 801 (1952); National Van 
Lines, Inc. v. Herbert, 140 N.W. 2d 36, 81 S.D. 633, 
(1966); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Harbin, 190 S.E. 
2d 91, 126 Ga. App. 72 (1972). 
The above cases support the rule that both the con-
signor and the consignee are both contractually and or 
statutorily liable for all charges incident to goods trans-
ported by a carrier. However, recent cases have held that 
the consignee's liability is not an absolute liability and 
that the carrier may be estopped from enforcing its rights 
if the carrier's conduct warrants such action. None of the 
recent cases have held that a consignee may avoid liability 
for unpaid carrier charges in the absence of estoppel. 
In both the Admiral and the Missouri Railroad cases, 
the defense of estoppel was upheld under the following 
circumstances: (1) the consignee had paid the carrier 
charges to the consignor, (2) all of the Bills of Lading 
were marked "Prepaid", and (3) it was affirmatively 
shown that the consignee relied on the prepayment nota-
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tion on the Bills of Lading. Under the above specific facts, 
it was held that the consignee was not liable for unpaid 
carrier charges. 
In the instant case, however, the facts are substan-
tially different: (1) The consignee did not pay the con-
signor, (2) All of the Bills of Lading were not marked 
"Prepaid", and (3) The consignee affirmatively stated that 
he did not rely on the carrier's Bills of Lading. 
It is generally well settled that the effect of equitable 
estoppel is to prevent the assertion of what would other-
wise be an unequivocal right. State v. Mutual Life Ins. 
Co., 175 Ind. 59, 93 N.E., 213 (1910); P. V.&K. Coal Co. 
v. Kelly, 301 Ky. 186, 191 S.W. 2d. 231 (1954). Estoppel 
serves to prevent losses otherwise unescapable. Peacock 
v. Home, 159 Ga. 707, 126 S.E. 813 (1925); Sudden & 
Christensen v. Crossett Western Lumber Co. (The Tarn-
pico), 270 F. 537 (9th Cir., 1921). In other words, but for 
the estoppel, the consignee would be liable for the carrier 
charges. 
In an Oregon case just recently decided, the consignee 
was held liable to a carrier for unpaid carrier charges even 
though the consignee had paid the freight charges pursu-
ant to a contract made with the consignor, Consolidated 
Freigbtways Corp. v. Eddy, Supra. 
In this case the defendant Eddy had a contract with a 
shipper which provided that the shipper was responsible 
for the freight charges. Eddy paid the shipper the contract 
price in full which included the freight charges. The con-
tracted shipment was transported by the carrier to Eddy 
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"Collect". The carrier released the shipment to Eddy 
without collecting the charges. Some two years later, and 
after being unable to collect from the insolvent shipper, 
the carrier brought suit against the consignee Eddy for the 
unpaid carrier charges. Eddy alleged that the carrier's 
transaction with the shipper involved an extension of 
credit beyond the seven (7) day limit imposed by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and that he (Eddy) had 
no knowledge when he paid the shipper that the ship-
ment was collect. 
The defendant (Eddy) set forth the affirmative de-
fense of estoppel. The Court held that Eddy was liable 
for the carrier charges as Eddy had failed in his answer 
to allege that the Bills of Lading contained a notation 
that the freight had been prepaid or that the consignee was 
misled by representations or conduct of the carrier into 
assuming that the freight charges had been prepaid. 
In essence, the Oregon Court held that the consignee 
was liable for payment of the carrier charges even though 
the consignee had earlier paid the carrier charges to the 
consignor. 
The reason for the Court's holding was that the con-
signee had failed to adequately establish the elements 
necessary to sustain their affirmative defense of estoppel. 
In other words, the consignee failed to establish, 
(1) that representations of prepayment were made 
by the carrier to the consignee, and 
(2) that the consignee relied on these representations 
to their detriment. 
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The Court suggests though that if the consignee had 
been able to establish estoppel, the carrier would have 
been estopped from collecting the unpaid freight charges 
from the consignee. 
In light of the above, E. L. Murphy submits that in 
the absence of estoppel Climate Control is liable to 
the carrier, either contractually or statutorily, for all un-
paid carrier charges. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDER-
ING THE EQUITIES OF E. L. MURPHY 
OR THE POLICIES THAT MAY BE ESTAB-
LISHED IN THE FUTURE AND ITS EFFECT 
ON MOTOR CARRIERS GENERALLY. 
In all of the cases relied on by Climate Control and 
American Standard, the parties and transactions involv-
ed were, for the most part, straightforward, eg., the con-
signor delivered the goods to the carrier for shipment to 
the consignee under Bills of Lading marked "Prepaid". 
The consignee then paid the consignor who in turn did 
or did not pay the carrier. 
However, in the case before the Court, the consignee 
(Climate Control, Inc.) ordered the goods from a sup-
plier, (American Standard, Inc.). The supplier in turn 
contracted with B & M Trading to ship the goods to Cli-
mate Control, Inc. B & M Trading in turn contracted 
with the consignor, East Coast Drayage Co., who con-
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tracted with the carrier, E. L. Murphy Co., to deliver the 
goods to Climate Control. (See Exhibit "A".) 
Climate Control paid American Standard and Ameri-
can Standard paid B & M Trading. It is not known 
whether B & M Trading paid East Coast Drayage. How-
ever, it is known that East Coast Drayage, the consignor, 
never did pay the carrier, E. L. Murphy. 
Carriers are, in effect, servants of the public. This 
means that unless E. L. Murphy had good cause, they 
could not arbitrarily refuse to accept the goods from East 
Coast Drayage for delivery, 46 USC 316. American Stand-
ard, on the other hand, voluntarily selected B & M Trad-
ing, presumably after careful investigation. 
If the Court upholds the Summary Judgment granted 
to Climate Control and American Standard, E. L. Murphy 
believes that the door will be opened to encourage future 
fraudulent transactions wherein the carrier will be un-
able to collect unpaid carrier charges from a consignee 
whenever the consignee can establish that they had paid 
a third party even though the third party is not named on 
the Bills of Lading. In order to protect itself, the carrier 
would have no alternative but to operate on a cash, non-
credit basis. This would obviously be contrary to the 
intent of the ICC which has just recently permitted car-
riers to extend credit under 9 C.F.R. 1322.1. The courts 
should support this change in policy rather than hamper 
it. 
Further on the question of credit extension, the 
Court's attention is respectfully directed to the fact that 
it was American Standard who contacted B & M Trading 
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to arrange for the shipment of goods to Salt Lake City. 
Possibly, if American Standard exercised greater care in 
selecting the shipper, this predicament would never have 
arisen. Should the carrier be penalized for a supplier's 
negligence or lack of diligence in selecting a shipper? 
E. L. Murphy can further foresee that if the Summary 
Judgment granted to Climate Control and American 
Standard is upheld, an invitation shall be extended to 
unscrupulous shippers and suppliers to collude and suc-
cessfully bilk a carrier out of the charges due. The entire 
risk in transporting freight would then fall on the carrier 
who is in the poorest position of any of the parties to 
determine the financial responsibility of the shipper. The 
consignee or the supplier can conduct extensive credit 
checks before letting out a contract for shipment. The car-
rier, however, which operates as a public service, and, for 
the most part, is required by law to accept goods ten-
dered to them for delivery, has little, if any, opportunity 
to adequately protect itself from a collusive effort be-
tween a supplier and a shipper or to protect itself from a 
potentially insolvent shipper. 
If the equities of the carrier are not considered by the 
courts, it will not be long before the I.C.C. will intervene 
and make the consignee's liability absolute or in the alter-
native prevent any form of credit extension by the carrier. 
CONCLUSION 
It is Appellant's contention that Respondent's and 
Co-Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
erroneously granted. It is Appellant's contention that the 
record fails to establish that Appellant made any mislead-
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ing representations to the Respondent, and further that if 
representations were made that the record fails to estab-
lish that the Respondent relied on those representations 
and that such reliance was to their detriment. Instead, the 
record, and particularly the Affidavit of John Dillon, 
clearly establishes that payment of the carrier charges was 
made on their own volition and in accordance with the 
contract and invoices submitted to them by American 
Standard, Inc. 
Appellant further contends that the lower court's 
action in denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment was in error as the case law supports Appellant's 
position that in the absence of estoppel the consignee be-
comes statutorily and/or contractually liable to the car-
rier for unpaid freight charges. 
Finally, Appellant submits that if a balance of equi-
ties is to be achieved, and if potentially fradulent trans-
actions are to be avoided, liability of the consignee for 
payment of the carrier charges must be established, par-
ticularly when parties beyond and those listed in the Bills 
of Lading intercede. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD F. BOJANOWSKI 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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